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Abstract 
Despite the lack of robust empirical evidence, a growing number of media reports attempt to link climate 
change to the ongoing violent conflicts in Syria and other parts of the world, as well as to the migration crisis 
in Europe. Exploiting bilateral data on asylum seeking applications for 157 countries over the period 2006-
2015, we assess the determinants of refugee flows using a gravity model which accounts for endogenous 
selection in order to examine the causal link between climate, conflict and forced migration. Our results 
indicate that climatic conditions, by affecting drought severity and the likelihood of armed conflict, played a 
significant role as an explanatory factor for asylum seeking in the period 2011-2015. The effect of climate 
on conflict occurrence is particularly relevant for countries in Western Asia in the period 2010-2012 during 
when many countries were undergoing political transformation. This finding suggests that the impact of 
climate on conflict and asylum seeking flows is limited to specific time period and contexts. 
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21 Introduction 
The ongoing Syrian conflict, which began in March 2011, has drawn attention from both the scientific 
community and the media to the question of how climatic conditions can contribute to political unrest and 
civil war. Recent studies of the Syrian uprising have shown that growing water scarcity and frequent 
droughts, coupled with poor water management, led to multiyear crop failures, economic deterioration and 
consequently mass migration of rural families to urban areas (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al., 2015). Rapid growing 
population, overcrowding, unemployment and increased inequality put pressure on urban centres and finally 
contributed to the breakout of political unrest. Should these mechanisms be in place, the effect of 
anthropogenic climate change on the frequency and intensity of extreme events is expected to affect the risk 
of violent conflicts by aggravating such drivers of conflicts as poverty, food insecurity and inequalities 
(IPCC, 2014). 
Conflicts bring about a series of negative consequences including premature death, disability, psychological 
trauma, physical injury and malnutrition (Murray et al., 2002). Likewise, conflict can also be the cause of 
displacement. There is evidence that violence, in particular, serves as a main push factor in the case of forced 
migration (Moore and Shellman, 2004; Schmeidl, 1997). If climate change does induce conflict, then 
indirectly climate change also contributes to forced migration. Indeed, recent media headlines, especially 
those on Europes refugee crisis, often cite climate change-induced conflict in the Middle East and Africa as 
a major driver of the surge of migrants to Europe in the past couple of years. The narrative behind these 
headlines tend to follow a similar path, claiming climate change reduces availability and alters the distribution 
of resources such as water, food and arable land which in turn trigger violent conflict and, as a consequence, 
migration. However, scientific literature linking climate, conflict and migration together is relatively scare. 
Extant literature on the impacts of climate change on conflict and migration commonly assess how 
environmental pressures instigate outmigration and consequently how climate change-induced migration 
promote conflict in migrant receiving areas. The arrival of climate migrants can put pressure on infrastructure, 
services and the economy of the receiving area leading to competition over resources, especially when the 
resources are scarce (Reuveny, 2007). However, whilst this narrative is common amongst scholars of peace 
and conflict studies (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Reuveny, 2008, 2007), there is little empirical evidence supporting 
this claim (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007).(Reuveny, 2007). Generally, drivers of 
migration e.g. climate, political factors, economic conditions and conflict are considered simultaneously in 
the empirical specification without considering the pathway through which migration is determined. 
Typically, in macro-level studies at the country or regional level, migration flows are estimated using linear 
models controlling for relevant socioeconomic and political confounding variables. The specific impact of 
3climate on migration is then isolated, often using multivariate models (Piguet, 2010). Beine and Parsons 
(2015), for instance, include international violence along with climate-related variables and show that the 
increase in the incidence of international violence corresponds with higher migration flows. Likewise, using 
the occurrence of a civil war as a proxy for institutional quality, Drabo and Mbaye (2015) report a similar 
finding although this applies only to highly educated people. In any case, these models merely show the 
closed-formimpact of conflict on migration but do not make any links between climatic or environmental 
factors and conflict. These studies do not address the indirect pathway through which climate affects 
migration through conflict, as often claimed by the media. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no scientific study that has empirically established the links between 
climate change, conflict and migration and identified the causal pattern in a convincing manner, partly due 
to the inherent complexity of the task (Fröhlich, 2016) . As of now, both the empirical support and theoretical 
foundations of such relationship are scarce (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016). A recent article by Missirian and 
Schlenker (2017) addresses the relationship between asylum seeking and temperature fluctuations using 
asylum applications to the European Union between 2000 to 2014 as a proxy of conflict. Climate-induced 
conflict is thus not measured directly but through the assumption that asylum applications reflect distress-
driven migration. Apart from employing a very limited approach and exclusively using temperature as a 
single climatic indicator, the study does not explicitly examine the causal link between climate and conflict. 
The lack of scientific rigour of the interpretations of the results offered has caused justifiable criticism by 
fellow scholars1. Another recently published article by Owain and Maslin (2018) explores how droughts and 
temperature variability are related to population displacement and conflict in East Africa. By including both 
conflict and displacement in the same empirical model , the study merely tests the relationships between 
climatic factors and conflict; and climatic factors and migration. In this research design, it is not possible to 
explicitly disentangle the pathways through which climate influences migration.  
This paper aims to empirically establish the causal path from climate change to violent conflict and to cross-
border migration and explore how climate and conflict interplay in influencing cross-border migration. 
Exploiting the bilateral refugee flows data for the years 2006-2015 for 157 countries, we employs the sample 
selection methods for gravity-type models to first estimate the impact of climate on conflict and secondly 
how conflict influences forced migration. To the best of our knowledge, the causal link between climate, 
conflict and migration is investigated for the first time at this level of statistical rigour. Our study unpacks 
conflict as a causal mediator between climate change on the one hand and asylum migration on the other. 
This study thus provides an empirical assessment of scientific evidence on the popular claim regarding the 
1 See for example the discussion in http://wmbriggs.com/post/23581/.
4role of climate change on conflict and migration. The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 
2 provides a review of empirical literature on climate, conflict and migration and discusses underlying 
mechanisms through which climate can influence migration. Section 3 describes estimation methods and 
data. Section 4 presents the main results and additional results from the robustness check. Section 5 discusses 
the main findings and concludes. 
2 Review of literature on conflict, climate and migration 
As previously mentioned, there is no study that empirically assesses the existing causal relationships between 
climate, conflict and migration simultaneously. Empirical studies on the subject tend to be organized along 
the triplet axes of climate change and migration; climate change and conflict; and conflict and migration. 
With respect to the first strand of literature, there is no empirical consensus on the relationship and the 
direction of association between climate change and migration  climatic shocks may induce, constrain or 
have no impact on migration depending on the particular characteristics of the climatic shock and the region 
of occurrence. Cross-national studies based on household surveys and micro-censuses report mixed evidence: 
whilst an increase temperature is associated with higher international migration in Uganda, outmigration 
decreases with temperature rise in Burkina Faso and Kenya, and no relationship is found between migration 
and temperature anomalies in Nigeria and Senegal (Gray and Wise, 2016; Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 
2016). Even a series of studies that focus on the same country do not find an identical pattern. Rainfall deficits 
suppress US-bound migration from rural Mexico according to some studies (Hunter et al., 2013; Nawrotzki 
et al., 2015) but increase migration according to another (Barrios Puente et al., 2016). Likewise, a set of 
macro level studies of bilateral migration between countries also report inconsistent findings with 
international migration increases with higher temperature on the one hand (Backhaus et al., 2015; Cai et al., 
2016; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016) and no relationship is found in other pieces (Beine and Parsons, 2015).  
Inconsistency in the existing empirical findings is largely due to heterogeneity in measurement, methods and 
data used (Beine and Jeusette, 2018). Climate variables include both slow onset and fast onset events. The 
former captures long-run climatic factors typically measured as levels, deviations, anomalies or variability 
of precipitation and temperature. Fast onset climatic factors generally capturing natural disaster events 
including temperature and precipitation extremes, floods, storms and droughts. Definitions of what is 
considered to be deviations from normality and extreme events, for instance, vary across studies. Likewise, 
migration encompasses different types of mobility including internal and international migration, forced and 
voluntary migration and is sometimes indirectly measured e.g. using the rate of urbanisation as a proxy for 
internal migration (Barrios et al., 2006). The choices of climate and migration definitions and measures thus 
5can influence the direction and magnitude to which climate affects migration.  
Furthermore, the lack of consensus of these findings is partly due to the complexity of migration processes;  
climatic impacts on migration might be indirectly mediated through social, demographic, economic, political 
and environmental factors (Black et al., 2011; Hugo, 2011). . The most widely used conceptual framework 
in the study of environmental migration is that of Black et al. (2011) which explains that in addition to direct 
influence, environmental change induces changes in other drivers of migration and thus indirectly affects 
migration decision. Indeed, some macro-level studies provide support of the indirect effect of climatic factors 
on international migration which run through reduction of crop yields (Cai et al., 2016), changes in GDP per 
capita (Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Coniglio and Pesce, 2015) and wage differences between origin and 
destination (Beine and Parsons, 2015). Even considering only the indirect channel, the effect of climatic 
factors on the mediators is not homogenous. Cattaneo and Peri (2016), for instance, report increased 
migration for middle-income countries whilst migration is suppressed in low-income countries with higher 
temperature. 
Climate change can potentially influence the drivers of migration through difference climatic hazards such 
as a rise in sea level, change in tropical storm and cyclone frequency and intensity, changes in rainfall 
patterns, increases in temperature and changes in atmospheric chemistry (Black et al., 2011). These changes 
directly affect the environmental drivers of migration such as reduction in water availability and crop and 
pasture productivity, as well asloss of ecosystem services. Climate change also indirectly influences other 
drivers of migration. For instance, economic drivers are affected through the reduction of household incomes 
due to a decline in crop, livestock or fisheries productivity. Similarly, climate change exacerbates the 
availability of limited resources and violence emerges over access to these resources (Raleigh, 2010). Indeed, 
a systematic review of 53 studies on environmental change and migration focusing on Africa by Borderon et 
al. (2018) reports that there is no evidence showing that environmental change is a sole driver of migration. 
Considering complex interactions between migration drivers thus is essential when examining the link 
between climate and migration. As for the second strand of literature on the relationship between climate and 
conflict, the evidence from large-scale studies is fairly robust. A recent meta-analysis of 60 quantitative 
studies confirms that the risk of conflict increases substantially with deviations from normal precipitation 
and mild temperatures (Hsiang et al., 2013). On average, one standard deviation change toward warmer 
temperatures or more extreme rainfall increases frequency of interpersonal violence by 4% and intergroup 
conflict by 14%. Another meta-analysis of 55 studies report a similar finding whilst emphasising that climate 
is unlikely to be the sole or even the primary driver of human conflict (Burke et al., 2015). Similar to how 
climate may affect migration, changes in the climate also influence conflict through multiple pathways 
6ranging from agriculture and economic productivity, demographic pressure to psychological mechanisms. 
However, quantitative research examining key causal pathways is still in its infancy and more evidence is 
called for. 
Although there is no statistical evidence of the link between climate and conflict in Syria, the Syrian uprising 
provides a case study of how climate change and drought played a role in triggering conflict. During the 
period 2007-2010, Syria had experience the worst drought likely to be caused by anthropogenic climate 
change (Kelley et al., 2015). The three-year severe drought resulted in a dramatic reduction of the supply of 
groundwater. Severe droughts coupled with inadequate water management decisions, poor planning and 
policy errors led to large-scale multiyear crop failures. Dramatically rising food prices coupled with 
economic deterioration led to displacement and migration of rural farming families to urban areas (Gleick, 
2014). The rapid increase in urban population from 8.9 million in 2002 to 13.8 million in 2010 put pressure 
on infrastructure, economic resources and social services in the urban areas which were key areas being 
neglected by the Assad government. The devastating consequences of drought due to poor governance and 
unsustainable agriculture and environmental policies consequently contributed to political unrest in Syria 
(Kelley et al., 2015). This narrative describes a pathway trough which climate change triggers conflict 
through interactions with other factors.  
If climate does influence conflict, the next question is how conflict is linked with migration. The evidence 
from the third strand of literature on conflict and migration suggests countries experiencing different types 
of violent conflict have higher outmigration and refugee flows (Beine and Parsons, 2015; Drabo and Mbaye, 
2015; Gröschl and Steinwachs, 2016; Hatton and Williamson, 2003). However, not all conflicts result in 
migration and push factors play a role in determining outmigration flows whilst the area of destination is 
determined by pull factors attracting migrants to a specific region. Similar to the relationship between climate 
and migration, it is unlikely that conflict alone is not a major driver of mobility and displacement but tradition 
push and pull factors such as differences in per capita income between origin and destination, population size 
and distance also play a role in determining outmigration (Czaika and Kis-Katos, 2009; Lozano-Gracia et al., 
2010). However, when conflict involves violence as measured by e.g. the ratio of victims of massacres, 
migration outflows increase with violence at the origin and migration inflows decreases as violence 
intensifies at the destination (Lozano-Gracia et al., 2010).  
It is also plausible that the influence of conflict on outmigration is indirect. Conflict affects many factors that 
may in turn induce migration, such as income loss, the breakdown of social relations and institutional failures. 
Some studies, for instance, do not find the direct effect of armed conflicts on migration but through the 
reduction in GDP per capita in origin countries (Coniglio and Pesce, 2015).  
7Note that the relationship between conflict and migration can be reverse. Literature in peace and conflict 
studies, in particular, often perceive conflict as an outcome of environmental migration (Raleigh, 2010; 
Reuveny, 2008, 2007). It is hold that environmental degradation and resource scarcity lead to population 
movements in response to environmental pressure. The increase in the number of migrants can contribute to 
conflict in migrant receiving areas in many different ways. This ranges from competition over natural and 
economic resources, ethnic tensions, socioeconomic tensions and burden on infrastructure and services. 
Reuveny (2007) emphasises that in the context of neo-Malthusian resource scarcity, climate change-induced 
migration is particularly prone to creating conflict in the destination area because large and rapid migration 
flows prevent the receiving areas to smoothly incorporate the migrants. There is however not much empirical 
support for this theoretical model, especially because the evidence on climate-induced mass migration is 
weak  (Brzoska and Fröhlich, 2016; Fröhlich, 2016) and there are many other factors (e.g. political stability, 
economic conditions and capacity of government to provide services) that are significant than migration 
(Burrows and Kinney, 2016) . The lack of evidence is supported by a recent study by Cattaneo and Bosetti 
(2017) using the two-stage least squares approach. The study finds no significant relationship between the 
presence of international climate migrants and conflict in destination countries. Therefore, a reverse causation 
of climate-induced migration leading to conflict is unlikely in our case. 
Based on the empirical literature on the relationships between climate and conflict; and conflict and 
migration, the impact of climate change on migration can be thought of as being mediated through conflict 
as presented in Figure 1. The relationship between climate change, conflict and migration is likely to follow 
the sequence of climate change exacerbating human conflict due to competition over scarce resources. For 
instance, recurrent severe droughts due to climate change can lead to conflict and instability in a country with 
poor management of natural resources. Consequently, climate-induced conflict outbreak drives displacement 
and outmigration. Figure 1 also presents a possibility of the reverse causation depicted by grey arrows 
whereby climate change first drives outmigration and subsequently migrant pressure contributes to conflict. 
The latter relationship however is not the focus of this study. 
8Figure 1: Conceptual model of climate, conflict and migration 
To model for the sequences of the relationship between climate, conflict and migration, the analysis should 
be done in two steps by first looking at how climate influences conflict and secondly how conflict drives 
migration. Nevertheless, generally, drivers of migration (e.g. climate, political factors, economic conditions 
and conflict) are assessed simultaneously without considering the causal structure through which migration 
is determined. To this end, this study aims at empirically establishing the causal path from climate change to 
violent conflict and to cross-border migration, and to explore how climate and conflict interplay in 
influencing cross-border migration. Exploiting bilateral asylum seeking flow data for the years 2006-2015 
for 157 countries, we employ a gravity-type model with endogenous selection to first estimate the impact of 
climate on conflict and secondly to assess how conflict influences forced migration. This study thus provides 
an empirical assessment of the popular claim regarding the role of climate change on conflict and migration. 
3 Modelling global asylum-seeking flows and data 
3.1 Model specification and estimation methods 
Our modelling framework aims at assessing quantitatively the determinants of asylum seeking flows using a 
gravity equation setting similar to that proposed for bilateral migration data (Cohen et al., 2008)  but 
addressing explicitly the statistical problems caused endogenous selection in  origin-destination pairs and 
non-random treatments. In this sense, our statistical problem is similar to those often encountered in health 
care studies, where for example the enrollment in a healthcare maintenance organisation (treatment) affects 
9a person’s decision on both whether to use healthcare at all (extensive margin) and how much to spend for 
healthcare (intensive margin), given a positive decision. 
In our setting, however, conflict (treatment) itself is not randomly ‘assigned’ across our population of origin 
countries, that is, we have to consider the treatment itself to be endogenous as well. As with the healthcare 
example given above, this treatment (conflict) potentially affects the probability that we observe non-zero 
flows between some origin-destination country pairs (extensive margin). In other words, we have to account 
for a selection of countries in sending out migrants to a certain country of destination. Furthermore, conflict 
potentially affects the number of migrants seeking asylum in some destination country. These figures, 
however, are only observed in the case of actual flows and thus have to be considered as being potentially 
non-randomly censored. 
This setting leaves us with three simultaneous equations, where two of them contain our common endogenous 
binary regressors (i.e. conflict onset). In order to estimate this framework of simultaneous equations, we 
apply a simple two-step estimation technique proposed by Kim (2006). Translated to our context, we are 
interested in the following sample selection model that contains a common endogenous dummy variable in 
the selection equation (1) and the censored equation (2). 
∗  ,′  ,,   ∗  0, 1	
				∗  ,′     ,,   ∗  0,					2	
				∗  ,′     ,,   ∗ , 3
where equation (1) specifies the occurrence of conflict (  1) in country i, equation (2) address whether a 
non-zero flow of asylum seeking applications takes place from country i to country j (  1) and equation 
(3) models the size of the flow of applications (in logs,   1) from origin country i to destination country
j for origin-destination pairs with non-trivial flows.. is an indicator function taking value one if x is true 
and zero otherwise and the exogenous controls for each one of the equations in the model are summarized in 
the vectors ,, , and ,, respectively. The error terms,  ,  and  are assumed jointly multivariate 
normal and potentially correlated, thus capturing the endogenous selection of origin countries that present 
non-zero asylum applications to endogenously selected destination countries.  
Following Kim (2006), this sample selection model with a common endogenous regressor in the selection 
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equation and the censored outcome equation is estimated as a hybrid of the bivariate probit and the type-II 
Tobit model containing the common endogenous binary conflict indicator. This implies that we have to 
control for the endogeneity caused by  and the selection bias caused by the censoring indicator  at the 
same time.  
Instead of a simulation assisted Full Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach we follow Kim (2006) and 
employ a simple two-step estimation technique by first estimating the bivariate probit model with structural 
shift (equations (1) and (2)) and further use the estimation results of this first stage as control functions for 
the censored outcome equation using a simple Generalized Method of Moments Estimator (GMM). This way 
we can interpret the Molde as a Type V-Tobit model with a bivariate selection and parameter restrictions. 
This approach bears the advantage of being numerically robust and easy to implement since it relaxes the 
strong normality assumptions imposed when using the FIML approach.  
For the empirical identification we impose exclusion restrictions, that is, for each regression we include 
regression specific covariates that identify treatment and selection, respectively. These regression specific 
covariates affect the main dependent variable (i.e. number of asylum applicants) only through the 
instrumental variable (endogenous treatment or selection identifier in our case) and not directly. This 
statistical approach allows us to directly discuss potential climate related effects on conflict and thus - through 
the imposed statistical structure - on asylum seeker flows. 
3.2 Data and measurement 
3.2.1 Asylum-seeking flows data and patterns 
Dyadic data on asylum applications are sourced from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNHCR) (UNHCR, 2018). The data are provided to UNHCR by a mixture of sources. In more 
developed countries, the host government are generally the sole data provider, whilst in developing countries 
UNHCR field offices and other NGOs play a more important role in data collection.  
Asylum seekers are defined as individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for 
refugee status have not yet been determined. The UNHCR data contains information about asylum 
applications by year and the progress of asylum-seekers through the refugee status determination process 
starting in the year 2000. We focus on asylum seeking applications for two reasons. First, asylum seeking 
can be linked to conflict more directly than regular migration which is driven by various other push and pull 
factors. Second, whilst refugee flows are also likely to be driven by conflict, they are endogenous to a host 
countrys specific policy in granting a refugee status. We therefore use asylum application data since actual 
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stock and refugee figures are prone to be strongly affected by country-specific political actions. 
Figure 2: Asylum seeking flows by world region, 2006-2010 and 2011-2015 
Figure 2 shows chord diagram plots depicting cumulative bilateral links for asylum seekers in the periods 
2006-2010 and 2011-2015 based on data country of origin - country of applications data from the UNHCR. 
In the first period considered, the largest source of asylum seekers was from Sub-Saharan Africa with many 
making applications within the region. Additionally, Western Europe received a large volume of asylum 
applications, especially from Northern Africa and Western Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia. In 
the period 2011-2015, the number of asylum applications in Sub-Saharan Africa remained large (about 1.8 
million asylum seekers came from the region). However, the largest origin region of asylum seekers was 
from Northern Africa and Western Asia (over 2.4 million), predominantly in Syria and other countries 
affected by the Arab spring. Many of those seeking asylum from these countries made applications in 
Southern Europe and Western Europe. 
3.2.2 Conflict data 
Information on battle-related deaths are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced 
Event Dataset (GED) Global version 17.1 (UCDP, 2018). The dataset contains 135181 events and the dataset 
covers the entirety of the Globe (excluding Syria), with information ranging from January 1989 to December 
2016. The figures for Syria are obtained from the UCDP Battle Related Deaths Dataset 17.1, which contains 
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conflict-year and dyad-year information on the number of battle-related deaths in conflicts from 1989 to 
2016. The most recent version is version 17.1. Conflict is defined in line with the UCDP GED as yearly 
battle-related deaths exceeding 25 casualties. Therefore, a country is considered to be in conflict if there are 
at least 25 casualties, both state-based and non-state-based, in a given calendar year. 
3.2.3 Climate data  
Climatic factor is measured using the Standardised Precipitation-Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI). SPEI is a 
multiscalar drought index based on climatic data and used for determining the onset, duration and magnitude 
of drought conditions with respect to normal conditions in a variety of natural and managed systems (e.g. 
crops, ecosystems, rivers).  SPEI data are obtained from the Global SPEI database, offering long-time, robust 
information about drought conditions at the global scale, with a spatial resolution of 0.5 degrees and monthly 
periodicity  (Beguería et al., 2010). The current version of the dataset covers the period between January 
1901 and December 2015 based on Climatic Research Units TS 3.23 input data (monthly precipitation and 
potential evapotranspiration) (Harris et al., 2014).  
SPEI measures the intensity and spatial distribution of droughts. It is considered superior to other drought 
indices, since it captures the effects of evaporation and transpiration caused by temperature, along with 
precipitation (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010). SPEI is measured on an intensity scale with both negative values, 
indicating drought conditions, and positive values, indicating wet conditions. The index can be used to further 
categorise drought conditions into mild ( -1 < SPEI < 0), moderate (-1.5 < SPEI ≤ -1), severe (-2 < SPEI ≤ -
1.5), and extreme (SPEI ≤ -2) (Mckee et al., 1993; Paulo and Pereira, 2006). 
3.2.4 Socioeconomic and geographic data 
The remaining covariates are derived from a variety of sources. Additional variables in Equations (1) and (2) 
include variables which are a standard battery of controls previously used in the literature when considering 
determinants of conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004). 
The variables such as ethnic polarization measurement, economic performance measured as log-transformed 
GDP per capita before the observational period and level of democratization are included to control for 
potential confounders of conflict. 
For the estimation of asylum-seeking flows, we include standard control variables i.e. distance between 
country of origin and country of destination, whether countries share a common language, colonial relation, 
population size at the country of origin and destination and migrant networks based on the previous literature 
using the gravity-type model to estimate bilateral migration flows in the context of climate change (Backhaus 
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et al., 2015; Beine and Parsons, 2015). This set of control variables captures bilateral and country-specific 
push and pull factors different from conflict in the country of origin. 
The data for the variables in the gravity model that builds the third stage of our empirical specification is 
partly sourced from Mayer and Zignago (2012), with data on the distance between countries based on capital 
cities. Note that the results are qualitatively unchanged when most populated areas or country centroids are 
used instead. The measurement of a country's political status is measured using the Polity IV index (Marshall 
et al., 2017)\, normalized between 0 (autocracy) and 1 (democracy). Our ethnic polarization measurement is 
obtained from the Geographical Research On War, Unified Platform (Bormann et al., 2015). When data are 
missing, the CIA Factbook is used as a source of information. For the calculation of the ethnic polarization 
index, we apply the Garcia-Montalvo (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005) and compute  
4


1  
Here,  is just the proportion of people that belong to the ethnic (religious) group i and N is the number of 
groups. We also estimated our model using conventional fractionalization indices 1  ∑  , yielding no 
qualitative changes to the results of our analysis. 
Socioeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita and population figures are sourced from Feenstra et al. 
(2015) and missing information in this dataset is interpolated the International Monetary Fund's WEO 
Database (IMF, 2018). 
4 Results 
4.1 Main	results	
Tables 1 and 2 present the parameter estimates of equations (1), (2) and (3), obtained using the method 
described in (Kim, 2006) for cross-sectional data corresponding to different 5-year subperiods (2006-2010, 
2011-2015), as well as three-year periods (2007-2009, 2010-2012 and 2013-2015). The parameter estimates 
for the equations modelling conflict and selection to asylum seeking are presented in Table 1. Our results 
indicate that armed conflict tends to be persistent, with countries that have experienced a large number of 
battle-related deaths prior to the period under study having a higher probability of conflict. Countries with 
levels of medium democracy, on the other hand, tend to present a higher probability of conflict when 
compared to their fully democratic or autocratic counterparts. Differences in the severity of drought episodes 
(related to lower values of the SPEI) are able to explain differences in the onset of conflict significantly in 
the period between 2011 and 2015, but not for 2006-2010. The predictive power of the variable is mostly 
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driven by its ability to explain conflicts occurring in the interval 2010-2012 and thus appear related to the 
emergence of armed conflict in the context of the Arab spring and the Syrian war, in addition to war episodes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. As can be inferred from the significant positive parameter estimate of the conflict 
dummy in the asylum seeking selection equation, countries that experience war tend to be systematically 
more prone to present non-zero asylum seeking applications to the rest of the world. Countries with a history 
of asylum seeking linkages (be it as an origin or a destination) tend to have a higher probability of sending 
or receiving asylum seeking applications, and this probability is also higher for nations which are 
geographically close to each other. 
The marginal effects of the SPEI variable on conflict and selection to asylum seeking for the 2010-2012 
period are presented in Figure 2 for all countries in our dataset. The nonlinearity embodied in the link 
between climate, conflict occurrence and refugee flows implies that the quantitative effect of changes in 
drought probabilities on asylum seeking depends on the rest of the variables of the model. The model 
therefore allows for global and regional economic conditions to affect the probability of a given climatic 
shock creating asylum seeking flows and predicts different effects by country. Aggregating marginal effects 
by world region, our results indicate that the effect of changes in the SPEI index appears particularly large 
in Sub-Saharan African countries, some Central and South American nations, as well as in Asia. The 
combined average marginal effect for the SPEI variable in the period 2010-2012 implies that a one (within-
country) standard deviation decrease in the SPEI leads on average to an increase of approximately 0.03 in 
the probability of asylum seeking flows from the country experiencing this change in climatic conditions. 
Such a link between changes in drought severity and asylum seeking flows is mediated by the increase in 
conflict probability caused by the change in the climatic variable, which can be very large in some world 
regions, as shown in the first panel of Figure 3. 
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Table 1: Parameter estimates: Conflict and selection to asylum seeking equations 
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Table 2: Parameter estimates: Asylum seeking flow size 
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The parameter estimates for equation (3), which have a direct specification as (semi-)elasticities are 
presented in Table 2. A significantly higher number of asylum seeking flows are found in destination 
countries where there is already a large number of migrant population from the corresponding origin nation, 
as well as between pairs of countries which share the same language. Asylum seeking applications tend to 
take place from countries with relatively low indicators of democracy to countries where civil liberties and 
political rights are well developed with higher standards of living as measured by GDP per capita, as well 
as from relatively small countries (in terms of population size) to relatively large countries. The parameter 
estimates for the distance variable and its squared term indicate that the flow of asylum seeking applications 
tends to be relatively smaller to countries which are very close to the origin country but that the effect of 
geographic separation becomes negative after reaching a maximum. In other words, asylum seeking 
applicants go to the destination country which is not too close and not too far from their country of origin. 
Depending on the subsample on which the estimation is carried out, the point estimates in Table 2 imply 
that existence of conflict in the origin country increases the flow of asylum seeking applications to a given 
destination by 84 to 133 percent. 
Based on the experience of the current decade, our results lend support to the existence of a mechanism 
whose causality runs in a first stage from climate to conflict and in a second stage from conflict to sending 
out asylum seekers and subsequently the size of asylum seeking flows. This causal linkage, however, is 
mostly related to the experience of conflicts in the years 2010-2012, a sub-period that was dominated by the 
birth of military conflicts in Libya, Egypt, Syria and South Sudan.  
4.2 Robustness	check	
The main results suggest that the influence of climate on conflict occurrence and subsequent asylum seeking 
flows applies to a specific geographical context and time period. We thus perform a robustness check using 
different model specifications including using the threshold of a positive number of battle-related deaths 
instead of 25 to identify conflict, as well as excluding Western Asia and Northern Africa in the sub-sample 
analyses.  
Tables 3 and 4 present the parameter estimates for conflict and selection to asylum seeking equations 
(Equations 1 and 2) for the period 2011-2015 and 2010-2012, respectively. For the period 2011-2015, 
changing the definition of our conflict variable and the sample of countries employed in the estimation does 
not substantially modify the results. However, in Table 4, we find that the effect of SPEI on conflict 
occurrence is specific to countries in Western Asia in the period 2010-2012. In 2010-2012, violent conflicts 
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were concentrated in Western Asia and Northern Africa. The model which excludes Northern African 
countries but including Western Asian countries show the significant effect of SPEI on conflict suggesting 
that the effect of climate on conflict found in the years 2010-2012 is driven by the events in Syria and its 
neighbouring countries. 
Figure 3: Marginal effects of SPEI on conflict and selection to asylum seeking for the 2010-2012 
period. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
Existing frameworks for the study of migration drivers tend to define five categories of factors affecting 
migration flows (see (Lee, 1966) and the embedding of this framework in climate change research by (Black 
et al., 2011): economic drivers (differences in income and employment opportunities that act as determinants 
of migration flows), political drivers (with conflict being one of its most important materializations), 
demographic drivers (related to the size and composition of populations in origin regions, as well as health-
related factors), social drivers (that include cultural practices) and environmental drivers (linked to 
ecosystem services). Our study concentrates on how environmental and political drivers interact with each 
other as determinants of forced migration as measured by asylum seeking applications. Our analysis assesses 
quantitatively the climate-conflict-migration association at a global level using an econometric model that 
aims at identifying these links explicitly. In contrast to the analysis carried out by Missirian and Schlenker 
(2017), our results indicate that there is no empirical evidence backing the existence of a robust link between 
climatic shocks, conflict and asylum seeking for the full period 2006-2015. The estimates of our model 
support this linkages only for the period 2010-2012, where global refugee flow dynamics were dominated 
by asylum seekers originating from Syria and countries affected by the Arab spring, as well as flows related 
to war episodes in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Excluding these regions from the analysis provides further statistical evidence, that the link between climate 
shocks, conflict and subsequent migration flows might rather be interpreted as local phenomena and 
therefore to be very specific to those regions. By analysing 41 African countries during 1981-99 Miguel et 
al. (2004) suggest that rainfall variation affect the probability of the onset of conflicts through its effects on 
GDP per capita. Thus, short-term drops in the opportunity costs (i.e. from forgone earnings because of 
drought periods) of being a rebel (or government) soldier significantly increases the incidence of civil 
conflict.  
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Table 3: Robustness check: Conflict and selection to asylum seeking equations for the period 2011-
2015 
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Table 4: Robustness check: Conflict and selection to asylum seeking equations for the period 2010-
2012 
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Indeed, our study shows that an increase in drought episodes can drive outmigration through exacerbating 
conflict in a country with some level of democracy. This is confirmed by the finding that climate contributes 
to conflict only in a specific period of 2010-2012 and specifically to certain countries, particularly those in 
Western Asia experiencing the Arab Spring. Climate change thus will not generate asylum seeking 
everywhere but likely in a country undergoing political transformation where conflict represents a form of 
population discontent towards inefficient response of the government to climate impacts. 
In line with Miguel et al. (2004) the results of our study imply that policies to improve the adaptive capacity 
to deal with the effects of climate change in developing economies may have additional returns by reducing 
the likelihood of conflict and thus forced migration outflows. From a policy point of views, our empirical 
analysis provides empirical backing to some of the arguments put forward, among others, by Barnett (2003), 
who argues for conceptualizing global responses to climate change also in the framework of national security 
considerations and human security concerns. The integration of concerns related to conflict-driven forced 
migration in the current policy discourse concerning actions to combat climate change appears particularly 
urgent in the context of the targets defined by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The link between 
climate change and migration is not made explicit in the SDGs, which focus on adaptation measures and do 
not treat forced migration and climate change as interrelated phenomena which may be moderated by 
conflict onset.  The results presented provide empirical backing to the connection of these two policy goals 
in the design of climate change responses at the global level, a proposal recently voiced also by Stapleton et 
al. (2017).  
Gaining a deeper understanding of the characteristics of migration flows which are driven by climate shocks 
is a potentially promising path of further research. The availability of data for refugee populations (see 
(Buber-Ennser et al., 2016), for example) should enable future empirical studies which will shed light on 
the particular mechanisms through which climate change acts as a push factor through its role as a catalyst 
of conflict. While our analysis concentrates on asylum seeking flows due to data availability at the global 
level, case studies that would be able to quantify forced migration flows in a more detailed manner would 
also be important in order to advance our knowledge on the causalities underlying the climate-conflict-
migration trinity.     
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